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Abstract
This paper considers the Byzantine consensus problem for nodes with binary inputs.
The nodes are interconnected by a network represented as an undirected graph, and
the system is assumed to be synchronous. Under the classical point-to-point communi-
cation model, it is well-known [7] that the following two conditions are both necessary
and sufficient to achieve Byzantine consensus among n nodes in the presence of up to
f Byzantine faulty nodes: n ≥ 3f + 1 and vertex connectivity at least 2f + 1. In the
classical point-to-point communication model, it is possible for a faulty node to equiv-
ocate, i.e., transmit conflicting information to different neighbors. Such equivocation is
possible because messages sent by a node to one of its neighbors are not overheard by
other neighbors.
This paper considers the local broadcast model. In contrast to the point-to-point com-
munication model, in the local broadcast model, messages sent by a node are received
identically by all of its neighbors. Thus, under the local broadcast model, attempts
by a node to send conflicting information can be detected by its neighbors. Under
this model, we show that the following two conditions are both necessary and sufficient
for Byzantine consensus: vertex connectivity at least ⌊3f/2⌋ + 1 and minimum node
degree at least 2f . Observe that the local broadcast model results in a lower require-
ment for connectivity and the number of nodes n, as compared to the point-to-point
communication model.
We extend the above results to a hybrid model that allows some of the Byzantine
faulty nodes to equivocate. The hybrid model bridges the gap between the point-
to-point and local broadcast models, and helps to precisely characterize the trade-off
between equivocation and network requirements.
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1
1 Introduction
This paper considers Byzantine consensus for nodes with binary inputs. The nodes are intercon-
nected by a communication network represented as an undirected graph, and the system is assumed
to be synchronous. Under the classical point-to-point communication model, it is well-known [7]
that the following two conditions are both necessary and sufficient to achieve Byzantine consensus
among n nodes in the presence of up to f Byzantine faulty nodes: n ≥ 3f + 1 and vertex con-
nectivity at least 2f + 1. In the classical point-to-point communication model, it is possible for
a faulty node to equivocate [4], i.e., transmit conflicting information to different neighbors. Such
equivocation is possible because messages sent by a node to one of its neighbors are not overheard
by other neighbors.
In contrast, in the local broadcast model [3, 14] considered in this paper, a message sent by any
node is received identically by all of its neighbors in the communication network. Thus, under the
local broadcast model, attempts by a node to equivocate (i.e., send conflicting information to its
neighbors) can be detected by its neighbors.
This paper obtains tight necessary and sufficient conditions on the underlying communication
network to be able to achieve Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model. As summarized
in Section 2, although there has been significant work [1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 22, 24, 25,
26, 28, 32] that uses either the local broadcast model or other models that restrict equivocation,
tight necessary and sufficient conditions for Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model
have not been obtained previously. In particular, this paper makes the following contributions,
some of which have been documented elsewhere [13, 20, 21] as well:
1) Necessary and sufficient condition: In Sections 4 and 5, we establish that, under the
local broadcast model, to achieve Byzantine consensus, it is necessary and sufficient for the
communication graph to have vertex connectivity at least
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1 and minimum degree at
least 2f . Observe that the local broadcast model results in a lower connectivity requirement as
compared to the (2f +1)-connectivity required under the point-to-point communication model.
2) Efficient algorithm: We constructively prove the sufficiency of the tight condition stated
above by presenting an algorithm that achieves Byzantine consensus. This algorithm, however,
is not efficient. For the case when vertex connectivity is at least 2f , we have a more efficient
algorithm, which is presented in the appendices. In Section 5.3, we present a tool used in
the algorithm which exploits the 2f -connectivity. Note that for f = 1, 2, the tight condition
presented above implies vertex connectivity of 2 and 4, respectively (i.e., connectivity equal to
2f when f = 1, 2).
3) Hybrid model: In Section 6, we extend the above necessary and sufficient condition to a
hybrid model wherein at most t ≤ f faulty nodes may have the ability to equivocate to their
neighbors (i.e., the ability to send messages to each neighbor without being overheard by the
other neighbors), while the remaining faulty nodes are restricted to local broadcast (i.e., their
messages will be received identically by all the neighbors). The point-to-point communication
model and the local broadcast model are both obtained as special cases of the hybrid model
when t = f and t = 0, respectively. Thus, the hybrid model provides a bridge between those
two models and helps to precisely characterize the trade-off between equivocation and network
requirements.
2
2 Related Work
There is a large body of work on Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms [2, 7, 16, 19, 23]. Here we
focus primarily on related work that imposes constraints on a faulty node’s ability to equivocate.
Rabin and Ben-Or [25] considered a global broadcast model and showed that n ≥ 2f + 1 is
both sufficient and necessary for consensus in a synchronous system. The local broadcast model
considered in our work reduces to the global broadcast model when the network is a complete graph.
The necessary and sufficient conditions obtained in this paper are (not surprisingly) equivalent to
n ≥ 2f + 1 when the network is a complete graph. Clement et. al. [5] also considered non-
equivocation in a complete graph under asynchronous communication. Our work obtains results
for arbitrary incomplete graphs with synchronous communication.
The goal of a Byzantine broadcast algorithm is to allow a single source node to deliver its
message reliably to all the other nodes. Prior work has explored such algorithms under the local
broadcast model [3, 14, 15]. However, the results for Byzantine broadcast do not provide insights
into the network requirements for Byzantine consensus problem considered in this paper.
There has been significant work on other similar models, sometimes called “partial broadcast”.
To motivate these models, consider a network consisting of several Ethernet channels, with a subset
of nodes Si being connected to channel i. Then, transmission by any node in Si on channel i will
be received by all the nodes in channel i. Each node may be connected to several different such
channels. An Ethernet channel to which h nodes are connected may be viewed as a h-hyperedge in
a communication network represented by a hypergraph. Fitzi and Maurer [9] considered a network
in which every subset of three nodes form a hyperedge, in addition to every subset of two nodes
also forming a hyperedge (i.e., a complete (2,3)-uniform hypergraph). Ravikant et. al. [26] also
considered a (2,3)-uniform hypergraph, but with only a subset of 3-hyperedges being present. Jaffe
et. al. [12] gave asymptotically tight bounds for the number of 3-hyperedges required in such
graphs. Amitanand et. al. [1] considered a complete network wherein, for each faulty node k,
the remaining nodes are partitioned such that transmission by the faulty node k to any node is
received identically by all the nodes in its partition. One key difference from our work is that we
consider incomplete networks, whereas [1] assumes that each node can communicate directly with
all the other nodes. Amitanand et. al. [1] considered an adversary structure that characterizes
the set of nodes that may be simultaneously faulty, instead of using a threshold on the number
of faults. Other work [6, 10, 11, 32] has explored the trade-off between reliability and privacy on
partial broadcast networks.
Some prior work has explored a restricted class of iterative algorithms that achieve approximate
Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model [17, 34]. In particular, this class of algorithms
is iterative in nature, with a state variable at each node being updated in each iteration as a
linear interpolation of the states of selected neighbors. Due to the restriction on the algorithm
behavior, the network requirements exceed the necessary and sufficient conditions shown in this
paper. Additionally, these restricted algorithm structures yield only approximate consensus in
finite time. Li et. al. [18] extended this line of work to a network consisting of 3-hyperedges and
2-hyperedges. Vaidya et. al. [27, 30, 31] have investigated the iterative algorithm structure in the
point-to-point communication model.
3 System Model and Notation
We consider a synchronous system. The communication network interconnecting n nodes is repre-
sented by an undirected graph G = (V,E). Every node in the system knows graph G. Each node u
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is represented by vertex u ∈ V . We will use the terms node and vertex interchangeably. Two nodes
u and v are neighbors if and only if uv ∈ E is an edge of G. For a set S ⊆ V , node u is said to be
a neighbor of set S if u 6∈ S and there exists v ∈ S such that uv ∈ E.
Each edge uv represents a FIFO link between the two nodes u and v. When a message m sent
by node u is received by node v, node v knows that m was sent by node u. In Sections 4 and 5,
we assume the local broadcast model wherein a message sent by a node u is received identically
and correctly by each node v such that uv ∈ E (i.e., by each neighbor of u). A hybrid model is
considered later in Section 6.
A Byzantine faulty node may exhibit arbitrary behavior. We consider the Byzantine consensus
problem assuming that each node has a binary input. The goal is for each node to output a binary
value, satisfying the following conditions, in the presence of at most f < n Byzantine faulty nodes.
1) Agreement: All non-faulty nodes must output the same value.
2) Validity: The output of each non-faulty node must be the input of some non-faulty node.
3) Termination: All non-faulty nodes must decide on their output in finite time.
Paths in graph G: A path is a sequence of nodes such that any two adjacent nodes in the sequence
are neighbors in the graph.
• For u, v ∈ V , a uv-path Puv is a path between nodes u and v. u and v are endpoints of path
Puv. Any node in path Puv that is not an endpoint is said to be an internal node of Puv. All
uv-paths have u and v as endpoints, by definition. Two uv-paths are node-disjoint if they do
not have any internal nodes in common.
• For U ⊂ V and a node v 6∈ U , a Uv-path is a uv-path for some node u ∈ U . All Uv-paths have v
as one endpoint. Two Uv-paths are node-disjoint if they do not have any nodes in common except
endpoint v. In particular, although two node-disjoint Uv-paths have endpoint v in common, the
other endpoints are distinct for the two paths.
Fault-free paths: A path is said to exclude a set of nodes X ⊂ V if no internal node of the path
belongs to X; however, its endpoints may potentially belong to X. A path is said to be fault-free
if none of its internal nodes are faulty. In other words, a path is fault-free if it excludes the set of
faulty nodes. Note that a fault-free path may have a faulty node as an endpoint.
Degree and Connectivity: The degree of a node u is the number of u’s neighbors (i.e., the
number of edges incident to u). Minimum degree of G is the minimum over the degree of all the
vertices in G. A graph G is k-connected if n > k and removal of less than k nodes does not
disconnect G. By Menger’s Theorem [33] a graph G is k-connected if and only if for any two nodes
u, v ∈ V there exist k node disjoint uv-paths. Another standard result [33] for k-connected graphs
is that if G is k-connected, then for any node v and a set of at least k nodes U there exist k
node-disjoint Uv-paths.
4 Necessary Conditions under Local Broadcast
Theorem 4.1 below states the necessary conditions for Byzantine consensus under the local broad-
cast model. Section 5 presents a Byzantine consensus algorithm and constructively proves that the
necessary conditions are also sufficient.
Theorem 4.1. If there exists a Byzantine consensus algorithm under the local broadcast model on
graph G tolerating at most f Byzantine faulty nodes, then both the following conditions must be
true: (i) G has minimum degree at least 2f , and (ii) G is (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1)-connected.
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Appendix A presents a proof of Theorem 4.1. Necessity of conditions (i) and (ii) in the theorem
is proved separately in Lemmas A.1 and A.2, respectively. We use a state machine based approach
[2, 7, 8] to prove Lemmas A.1 and A.2.
It should be easy to see that a complete graph consisting of 2f +1 nodes satisfies the necessary
conditions in Theorem 4.1 for any f . Figure 1 presents other examples of graphs that satisfy the
necessary conditions. Figure 1(a) shows a cycle consisting of 5 nodes. For this graph, the minimum
degree is 2, and the graph is 2-connected. Thus, the cycle satisfies the conditions in Theorem 4.1
for f = 1. The graph in Figure 1(b) satisfies the necessary conditions when f = 2.
1
2
3 4
5
(a) f = 1 (b) f = 2
Figure 1: Example graphs satisfying conditions in Theorem 4.1
Section 5 below proves that the above necessary conditions are also sufficient. Before proceeding
to Section 5, let us consider the 5-node cycle in Figure 1(a) to build some intuition on why these
conditions may be sufficient. Since f = 1, we do not have 2f +1 node-disjoint paths between every
pair of nodes in the cycle in Figure 1(a). Despite lower connectivity, we can show a useful property.
In particular, suppose that node 1 attempts to send a message M to node 4, by transmitting it
along two node-disjoint paths 1-2-3-4 and 1-5-4, respectively. That is, node 1 will send the message
to nodes 2 and 5 (its neighbors) in a single transmission – local broadcast model allows node 1 to
send its message to all its neighbors simultaneously. The neighbors 2 and 5 will then forward the
message and subsequently, node 3 will forward the message received from node 2. Due to the local
broadcast model, all neighbors of each node will receive its transmissions. Consider two cases:
• Case (i): The internal nodes (namely, 2, 3 and 5) on the two paths behave correctly: In this case,
node 4 receives identical copies of the message along the two disjoint paths. Because f = 1, node
4 can be certain that it has correctly received the message that was transmitted by node 1 (when
f = 1, internal nodes on at most one disjoint path may be faulty).
• Case (ii): Node 3 is faulty, and tampers the message received from node 2 before forwarding it to
node 4: In this case, node 4 will not receive two identical message copies along the two disjoint
paths. Therefore, node 4 cannot determine the message sent by node 1. However, in this case,
node 2 is non-faulty. Node 2 correctly forwards message M received from node 1 to node 3, and
then observes that node 3 is forwarding a tampered message to node 4, not the correct message
M . Node 2 can observe the faulty behavior of node 3 due to the local broadcast property –
when node 3 sends the tampered message to node 4, node 2 receives it too, because node 2 is a
neighbor of node 3.
Node 2 can now notify node 1 that node 3 is faulty. Of course, on receiving this notification,
node 1 cannot be certain whether node 3 is indeed faulty, or node 2 is faulty and it is incorrectly
accusing node 3 of misbehavior. However, node 1 can be certain that one of nodes 2 and 3
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must be faulty. Because f = 1, node 1 can then infer that the path 4-5-1 is fault-free. Thus,
any messages received by node 1 from node 4 along the path 4-5-1 could not be tampered by
the internal node on this path, namely, node 5. This allows node 1 to now receive messages
transmitted by node 4 reliably.
The example above can be generalized to derive a similar capability for reliable communication
in at least one direction between each pair of nodes. Although the algorithm presented next does
not seem to explicitly utilize this property, it implicitly relies on such a behavior.
5 Byzantine Consensus Algorithm under Local Broadcast
Theorem 5.1 below states that the necessary conditions in Theorem 4.1 are also sufficient.
Theorem 5.1. Under the local broadcast model, Byzantine consensus tolerating at most f Byzan-
tine faulty nodes is achievable on graph G if both the following conditions are true: (i) G has
minimum degree at least 2f , and (ii) G is (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1)-connected.
We prove correctness of Theorem 5.1 constructively by providing a Byzantine consensus algo-
rithm (in Section 5.1) and showing its correctness (in Section 5.2).
5.1 Proposed Algorithm
Assume that graph G satisfies the properties stated in Theorem 5.1. That is, G has minimum
degree at least 2f and is (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1)-connected. Pseudo-code for the proposed algorithm is
presented below. To understand the description presented next, it will help the reader to read the
corresponding steps in Algorithm 1 below.
Initialization: Each node v ∈ V maintains a local state variable named γv, which is initialized to
equal node v’s binary input.
Phases of the algorithm: Recall that we assume a synchronous system. The execution of the algo-
rithm is divided into many phases, each phase corresponding to a distinct subset of nodes F , such
that F contains at most f nodes. Each iteration of the For loop in Algorithm 1 corresponds to
one phase of the algorithm. The set F chosen in each phase is a candidate for the actual set of
faults; however, set F in only one of the phases will exactly equal the actual set of faulty nodes
in the given execution. This is similar to the Byzantine consensus algorithm for directed graphs
under the point-to-point communication model by Tseng and Vaidya [29]. However, the rest of the
algorithm proceeds differently since we consider the local broadcast model.
Step (a): At the beginning of each phase, each node v attempts to communicate its current value
of γv via “flooding”, as described soon. Any message transmitted during flooding has the form
(b,Π), where b ∈ {0, 1} and Π is a path. Flooding proceeds in synchronous rounds, with each node
possibly forwarding messages received in the previous round, following the rules presented below.
Flooding will end after n rounds, as should be clear from the following description.
To initiate flooding of its γv value, node v transmits message (γv,⊥) to its neighbors, where ⊥
represents an empty path. Each node in the network similarly initiates flooding of its own γ value
in step (a). If v is faulty and does not initiate flooding, then non-faulty neighbors of v replace
the missing message with the default message of (1,⊥). Therefore, we can assume that a value is
indeed flooded by each node, even if it is faulty. When node v receives from a neighbor u a message
(b,Π), where b ∈ {0, 1} and Π is a path, it takes the following steps sequentially. In the following
note that Π - u denotes a path obtained by concatenating identifier u to path Π.
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(i) If path Π - u does not exist in graph G, then node v discards the message (b,Π). Recall that
each node knows graph G, and the message (b,Π) was received by node v from node u.
(ii) Else if, in the current phase, node v has previously received from u another message containing
path Π (i.e., a message of the form (b′,Π)), then node v discards the message (b,Π).
(iii) Else if path Π already includes node v’s identifier, node v discards the message (b,Π).
(iv) Else node v is said to have received value b along path Π - u and node v forwards message
(b,Π - u) to its neighbors. Recall that v received message (b,Π) from neighbor u.
Rules (i) and (ii) above are designed to prevent a faulty node from sending spurious messages.
Recall that under the local broadcast model, all neighbors of any node receive all its transmissions.
Thus, rule (ii) above essentially prevents a faulty node from successfully delivering mismatching
messages to its neighbors (i.e., this prevents equivocation). Rule (iii) ensures that flooding will
terminate after n rounds.
Rule (ii) above crucially also ensures the following useful property due to the local broadcast
model: even if node u is Byzantine faulty, but paths Puv and Puw are fault-free, then nodes v and w
will receive identical value in the message from u forwarded along paths Puv and Puw, respectively.
Recall that a path is fault-free if none of the internal nodes on the path are faulty.
Step (b): Recall that a path is said to exclude set F if none of its internal nodes are in F . For
each u ∈ V , node v chooses an arbitrary uv-path Puv that excludes F . It can be shown (Lemma
5.4) that such a path always exists under the conditions in Theorem 5.1. For the purpose of step
(b), node v is deemed to have received its own γv along path Pvv (containing only node v). Node
v computes sets Zv and Nv = V − Zv, as shown in the pseudo-code.
Step (c): This step specifies the rules for updating value γv. γv is not necessarily updated in each
phase.
Output: After all the phases (i.e., all iterations of the For loop) are completed, the value of γv is
chosen as the output of node v.
The proof of correctness of Algorithm 1 is presented in Section 5.2. As we discussed earlier
when describing the flooding mechanism, the faulty nodes are effectively limited to delivering a
unique value on all fault-free paths (i.e., paths that do not have faulty nodes as internal nodes).
If this unique value corresponding to a faulty node is 0, we will say that the faulty node flooded
value 0; else we will say that the node flooded value 1.
Let Z be the set of nodes that flooded 0 in step (a) and let N = V − Z be the set of the
remaining nodes that flooded 1. Recall from the description of flooding above, that even a faulty
node effectively floods one value, and one value only, in step (a) of each phase. Note that either
Z or N may possibly be empty, but not both. In step (b), each non-faulty node v obtains its own
estimates Zv and Nv of Z and V , respectively. If the set F in the current phase does not contain
all the faulty nodes, then these estimates can be incorrect. However, at least in one phase, F will
contain all the faulty nodes and, in that phase, as shown later, it is guaranteed that Z = Zv and
N = Nv. This observation is important for the correctness of the algorithm, as seen later.
As shown later, step (c) is designed to ensure that the fault-free nodes will reach consensus in
a phase in which F contains all the faulty nodes. In each phase, step (c) also ensures the invariant
that γv, at any non-faulty node v, at the end of the phase is equal to γu, for some non-faulty node
u, at the start of that phase.
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Algorithm 1: Proposed algorithm for Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model:
Steps performed by node v are shown here.
Each node v has a binary input value in {0, 1} and maintains a binary state γv ∈ {0, 1}.
Initialization: γv := input value of node v
For each F ⊆ V such that |F | ≤ f do
Step (a): Flood value γv. (The steps taken to achieve flooding are described in the text
preceding Algorithm 1 pseudo-code.)
Step (b): For each node u ∈ V , identify a single uv-path Puv that excludes F . Let,
Zv :=
{
u ∈ V | v received value 0 from u along Puv in step (a)
}
,
Nv := V − Zv.
Step (c): Define sets Av and Bv as follows.
Case 1: If |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Nv| > f , then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv.
Case 2: If |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Nv| ≤ f , then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv.
Case 3: If |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Zv| > f , then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv.
Case 4: If |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Zv| ≤ f , then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv.
If v ∈ Bv and v receives value δ ∈ {0, 1} along any f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths
that exclude F in step (a), then γv := δ.
end
Output γv.
5.2 Proof of Correctness of Algorithm 1
In this section, we assume that graph G satisfies the conditions stated in Theorem 5.1, even if this
is not always stated explicitly below. Appendix B presents the proofs of the lemmas in this section.
The proof of correctness relies on two key lemmas, Lemma 5.2 and 5.3. We will present ad-
ditional results and discuss the intuition behind the proof of these lemmas subsequently. Formal
proofs are presented in Appendix B. Recall that the algorithm execution is divided into phases, each
phase corresponding to a different choice of F , where |F | ≤ f . For convenience of presentation, we
will refer to γv as the “state of node v”. Recall that state γv of node v may possibly be modified
in step (c) in each phase.
Lemma 5.2. For a non-faulty node v, its state γv at the end of any given phase equals the state
of some non-faulty node at the start of that phase.
Lemma 5.3. Consider a phase of Algorithm 1 wherein all the faulty nodes are contained in set F
corresponding to that phase. At the end of this phase, every pair of non-faulty nodes u, v ∈ V have
identical state, i.e., γu = γv.
As shown next, these two lemmas imply correctness of Algorithm 1, thus proving Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Algorithm 1 terminates in finite time because the number of phases
is finite, and flooding in each phase completes in finite time. Thus, the algorithm satisfies the
termination condition.
Since there are at most f faulty nodes in any given execution, there exists at least one phase in
which set F will contain all the faulty nodes. Then, from Lemma 5.3, we have that all non-faulty
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nodes have the same state at the end of this phase. Lemma 5.2 implies that the state of the non-
faulty nodes will remain unchanged after any subsequent phases. Therefore, all non-faulty nodes
will have the same state at the end of the algorithm and their output will be identical. This proves
that the algorithm satisfies the agreement condition.
At the start of phase 1, the state of each non-faulty node equals its own input. Now, applying
Lemma 5.2 inductively implies that the state of a non-faulty node always equals the input of some
non-faulty node. This, in turn, implies that the algorithm satisfies the validity condition. Thus, we
have proved correctness of Algorithm 1 under the conditions stated in Theorem 5.1. 
The proofs of Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3, stated above, rely on two other lemmas, presented next.
The reader may skip the rest of this section without a loss of continuity. Lemma 5.4 below implies
that path Puv used in step (b) of the algorithm indeed exists.
Lemma 5.4. For any choice of set F in the algorithm, and any two nodes u, v ∈ V , there exists a
uv-path that excludes F .
Proof: Recall that a path is said to exclude F if none of the internal nodes in the path belong
to F . Since G is (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1)-connected, by Menger’s Theorem, there are at least
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1
node-disjoint paths between any two nodes u, v. For any f ≥ 0, we have
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+1 ≥ f +1. Thus,
there are at least f + 1 node-disjoint uv-paths, of which at least one path must exclude F , since
|F | ≤ f . 
The next lemma states that the choice of sets Av and Bv in step (c) ensures that the node-
disjoint paths used in that step indeed exist.
Lemma 5.5. For any non-faulty node v, and any given phase with the corresponding set F , in step
(c), if v ∈ Bv, then there exist f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths that exclude F .
The formal proof of the above lemma is presented in Appendix B. Observe that there are four
distinct cases in step (c) for determining sets Av and Bv. The proof of the above claim in cases 1
and 3 in step (c) follows from (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+1)-connectivity of graph G, while the proof in cases 2 and
4 follows from the fact that the minimum degree of G is at least 2f .
In step (c), observe that if node v modifies its state γv, then it must have received identical value
along f +1 node-disjoint Avv paths. So, at least one of these path must not only be fault-free, but
also have non-faulty endpoints. The proof of Lemma 5.2 in Appendix B relies on this observation.
Now consider Lemma 5.3. The correctness of this lemma relies on the local broadcast property
and rule (ii) used in flooding. Suppose that set F in a certain phase contains all the faulty nodes.
Since the paths used in step (b) of the algorithm exclude set F , these paths are fault-free (i.e.,
none of their internal nodes are faulty). Then, the earlier discussion of flooding implies that any
two non-faulty nodes u, v will obtain Zu = Zv and Nu = Nv in step (b) of this phase. By a similar
argument, all the paths used in step (c) of this phase are also fault-free, and any two non-faulty
nodes will end step (c) of this phase with an identical state. A complete proof of Lemma 5.3 is
presented in Appendix B.
5.3 An Efficient Algorithm
The number of phases in Algorithm 1 is exponential in f , since there exists one phase corresponding
to each choice of set F such that |F | ≤ f . When the communication graph G is 2f -connected, we
have developed an efficient algorithm that requires O(n) time. Although in general 2f -connectivity
is a stronger requirement on graph G as compared to the requirement in Theorem 5.1, observe that
when f = 1, 2 these two requirements are equivalent.
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Theorem 5.6. Under the local broadcast model, if G is 2f -connected, then Byzantine consensus
tolerating at most f Byzantine faults is achievable on graph G in O(n) synchronous rounds.
We prove Theorem 5.6 constructively by giving an efficient algorithm, which we present in
Appendix C. Using the example in Figure 1(a), we now illustrate a tool used in that algorithm,
which exploits the 2f -connectivity. The graph in Figure 1(a) is 2-connected, i.e., 2f -connected for
f = 1. Similar to our algorithm in the previous section, suppose that node 1 floods value b, which
is propagated to node 4 along path 1-2-3-4. When node 2 forwards the value to node 3, all of node
2’s neighbors hear the forwarded message. Similarly, when node 3 forwards the message to node 4,
all of node 3’s neighbors hear the forwarded message.
Suppose now that we ask each node to additionally “report” on its neighbors by flooding any
messages heard/received in the above propagation from node 1 to node 5. Then the message
forwarded by node 4, as overheard by node 3, will be flooded by node 3. Since the graph G is
2f -connected, node 4 has at least 2f neighbors, each of which will take similar steps. Now consider
two cases:
• Node 3 is faulty: Since node 3 is faulty, there are at most f − 1 other faulty nodes. In this case,
2f -connectivity implies that there are at least f +1 node-disjoint fault-free paths from neighbors
of node 3 to node 1. Thus, node 1 can receive f +1 identical and correct reports of all messages
transmitted by node 3. Therefore, node 1 can correctly determine the message forwarded by
node 3. In general, each node can correctly learn messages transmitted by any faulty node, when
the connectivity is 2f .
• Node 3 is non-faulty: In this case, it is possible that node 1 does not receive identical reports
about node 3’s messages on f + 1 node-disjoint paths. This inability to receive f + 1 identical
reports, however, allows node 1 to infer that node 3 must be non-faulty.
In summary, as illustrated above, each node can observe all messages sent by any faulty node.
Also, each node can either observe all messages sent by another non-faulty node, or learn that it
is non-faulty. In some instances, these observations help non-faulty nodes identify the faulty nodes
accurately. Our algorithm in Appendix C relies on this property to improve the time complexity.
6 Hybrid Model
In this section we consider a hybrid model. The hybrid model is designed to help explore the gap
between the network requirements for Byzantine consensus under the point-to-point communication
model and the local broadcast model. Under the hybrid model, up to f < n nodes may be Byzantine
faulty. The faulty nodes are of two types:
• Equivocating faulty nodes: At most t ≤ f of the faulty nodes may equivocate, that is, they are
not restricted to perform local broadcast. If u is an equivocating faulty node and has neighbors v
and w, then node u may send message Mv to node v without node w receiving Mv, and similarly
send message Mw to node w without node v receiving Mw. Thus, equivocating faulty nodes can
behave similar to the faulty nodes under the point-to-point communication model.
• Non-equivocating faulty nodes: Any faulty node that is not an equivocating faulty node is said
to be a non-equivocating faulty node. A non-equivocating faulty node conforms to the local
broadcast model. Thus, if node u is a non-equivocating faulty node, and has neighbors v and w,
then any message M transmitted by node u will be received identically by v and w both.
Observe that when t = 0, the hybrid model reduces to the local broadcast model, since all the
faulty nodes are restricted to perform local broadcast. On the other hand, when t = f , the hybrid
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model reduces to the classical point-to-point communication model because all the faulty nodes
can equivocate. The following theorem extends results from Sections 4 and 5 to the hybrid model.
Theorem 6.1. Under the hybrid model, Byzantine consensus tolerating at most f Byzantine faulty
nodes, of which at most t are equivocating faulty nodes, is achievable on graph G if and only if all
the following conditions are true:
(i) G is (
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+ 2t+ 1)-connected,
(ii) if t = 0, then G has minimum degree at least 2f , and
(iii) if t > 0, then every set of nodes S, such that 0 < |S| ≤ t, has at least 2f + 1 neighbors.
Observe that when t = 0, condition (ii) lower bounds the number of neighbor of each vertex.
On the other hand, when t > 0, condition (iii) lower bounds the number of neighbors of each subset
of nodes of size at most t. Recall that neighbors of S are nodes outside of S that have an edge to
some node in S. Theorem 6.1 is proved in Appendix D. Consider three cases:
• When t = 0, as noted earlier, the hybrid model reduces to the local broadcast model. In this case,
condition (iii) imposes no restrictions, and conditions (i) and (ii) reduce to the graph requirements
in Theorems 4.1 and 5.1.
• When t = f , the hybrid model reduces to the point-to-point communication model. In this case,
condition (ii) imposes no restrictions, condition (i) requires G to be (2f + 1)-connected, and
condition (iii) implies n ≥ 3f + 1.
• When 0 < t < f , the above theorem provides insights into the trade-off between equivocation
and network requirements.
The necessity and sufficiency of the conditions in Theorem 6.1 is proved using similar techniques
as the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 5.1, respectively. The proof of Theorem 6.1 appears in Appendix
D. To prove sufficiency, Algorithm 1 is modified to obtain an algorithm for the hybrid model – the
modified algorithm is presented in Appendix D.2.
7 Summary
In this work, we investigated Byzantine Consensus under the local broadcast model. We showed
that (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+1)-connectivity and minimum degree at least 2f are together necessary and sufficient
conditions to achieve Byzantine consensus in the presence of at most f Byzantine faults under the
local broadcast model. The sufficiency proof is constructive. However, the algorithm presented
requires exponential synchronous rounds. For a stronger network condition of 2f -connectivity, an
efficient algorithm that achieves consensus in linear number of rounds is presented in Appendix C.
We leave finding an efficient algorithm for the tight condition for future work.
We also considered a hybrid model where some faulty nodes may equivocate but other faulty
nodes are restricted to local broadcast. We presented necessary and sufficient conditions for this
model, which provide insights into the trade-off between equivocation and network requirements.
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A Proofs of Section 4
In the appendices, with a slight abuse of terminology, we allow a partition of a set to have empty
parts. That is, (Z1, . . . , Zk) is a partition of a set Y if
⋃k
i=1 Zi = Y and Zi ∩ Zj = ∅ for all i 6= j,
but some Zi’s can be possibly empty.
A Byzantine Consensus algorithm A outlines a procedureAu for each node u ∈ V that describes
state transitions of u. In each synchronous round, each node optionally sends messages to its
neighbors, receives messages from the neighbors, and then updates its state. The new state of u
depends entirely on u’s previous state and the messages received by u from its neighbors. The state
of u determines the messages sent by u.
Lemma A.1. If there exists a Byzantine consensus algorithm under the local broadcast model on
a graph G tolerating at most f Byzantine faulty nodes, then G has minimum degree at least 2f .
Proof: When f = 0, the lemma does not impose any restrictions on G. So we assume that f > 0.
It is easy to show that, when n > 1, each node must have at least one neighbor to be able to achieve
consensus. So in the rest of the proof we assume that the degree of each node in G is at least 1.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a node z in G of degree less than 2f and
there exists an algorithm A that solves Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model on G.
Then there exists a partition (F 1, F 2) of the neighborhood of z such that
∣∣F 1∣∣ < f and ∣∣F 2∣∣ ≤ f .
Let W = V − (F 1 ∪ F 2 ∪ {z}) be the set of remaining nodes. Note that some of these sets can be
possibly empty. However, since n > f > 0 and z has degree at least 1, we select these sets so that
F 2 is necessarily non-empty. Recall that A outlines a procedure Au for each node u that describes
u’s state transitions in each round.
We first create a network G to model behavior of nodes in G in three different executions E1,
E2, and E3, which we will describe later. Figure 2 depicts G. The network G has some directed
edges, the behavior of which will be explained later. We denote a directed edge from u to v as −→uv.
G consists of two copies of each node in W and a single copy of the remaining nodes. We denote
the two sets of copies of W as W0 and W1. For each node u ∈W , we denote by u0 and u1 the two
copies of u in W0 and W1 respectively. For each edge uv ∈ E(G), we create edges in G as follows:
1) If u, v ∈W , then there are two edges u0v0 and u1v1 in G. These edges are not shown in Figure
2.
2) If u, v ∈ V −W , then there is a single edge uv in G. Some of these edges are also not shown in
Figure 2.
3) If u ∈ F 1 and v ∈ W , then there are two edges uv0 and
−→uv1 in G. In Figure 2, these edges are
illustrated by a single undirected edge between sets F 1 and W0, and a single directed edge from
F 1 to W1.
4) If u ∈ F 2 and v ∈ W , then there are two edges −→uv0 and uv1 in G. In Figure 2, these edges are
illustrated by a single directed edge from F 2 to W1, and a single undirected edge between sets
F 2 and W0.
Note that there are no edges between W0 and W1. In Figure 2, this is emphasized by drawing a
cross on a dotted line between W0 and W1.
All message transmissions in G are via local broadcast, as follows. When a node u in G transmits
a message, the following nodes receive this message identically: each node with whom u has an
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F 1
0
F 2
1
W0
0
W1
1
Figure 2: Network G to model executions E1, E2, and E3. The edges in G are described in the text.
Edges within the sets are not shown while edges between sets/nodes are depicted as single edges.
The crossed dotted line between W0 and W1 emphasizes that there are no edges between W0 and
W1. The numbers adjacent to the sets/nodes are the corresponding inputs in execution E . Table 1
illustrates which nodes in E model the corresponding nodes in E1, E2, and E3.
undirected edge and each node to whom there is an edge directed away from u. Note that a directed
edge e = −→uv behaves differently for u and v. All messages sent by u are received by v. No message
sent by v is received by u. Observe that with this behavior of directed edges, the structure of G
ensures the following property. For each edge uv in the original graph G, each copy of u receives
messages from exactly one copy of v in G. This allows us to create an algorithm for G corresponding
to A as follows. For each node u ∈ G, if G has one copy of u, then u runs Au. Otherwise there are
two copies u0 and u1 of u. Both u0 and u1 run Au.
Consider an execution E of the above algorithm on G as follows. Each node in W0 ∪ F
1 ∪ {z}
has input 0 and the remaining nodes have input 1. Observe that it is not guaranteed that nodes
in G will decide on the same value or that the algorithm will terminate. We will show that the
algorithm does indeed terminate but nodes do not reach agreement in G, which will be useful in
deriving the desired contradiction. We use E to describe three executions E1, E2, and E3 of A on
the original graph G as follows (see also Table 1).
E1: F
2 is the set of faulty nodes. In each round, a faulty node broadcasts the same messages as the
corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. All non-faulty nodes have input 0.
Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in F 1∪{z} andW is modelled by the corresponding
(copies of) nodes in F 1 ∪ {z} and W0, respectively, in E . Since A solves Byzantine consensus
on G, nodes in W ∪ F 1 ∪ {z} decide on output 0 (by validity) in finite time.
E2: F
1 is the set of faulty nodes. In each round, a faulty node broadcasts the same messages as the
corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. z has input 0 and all the remaining
non-faulty nodes have input 1. Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in F 2 ∪ {z} and
W is modelled by the corresponding (copies of) nodes in F 2 ∪ {z} and W1, respectively, in E .
The output of the non-faulty nodes will be described later.
E3: F
1∪{z} is the set of faulty nodes. In each round, a faulty node broadcasts the same messages as
the corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. All non-faulty nodes have input
1. Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in F 2 and W is modelled by the corresponding
(copies of) nodes in F 2 and W1, respectively, in E . Since A solves Byzantine consensus on G,
nodes in W ∪ F 2 decide on output 1 (by validity) in finite time.
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(Sets of) nodes in network G
z F 1 F 2 W
Executions on graph G
E1 z F
1 F 2 W0
E2 z F
1 F 2 W1
E3 z F
1 F 2 W1
Table 1: This table illustrates which nodes in execution E on network G (Figure 2) model the
corresponding nodes in the three executions E1, E2, and E3 on graph G for proof of Lemma A.1.
The entries in red indicate faulty nodes in E1, E2, and E3.
Due to the output of nodes in W ∪ F 1 ∪ {z} in E1, the nodes in W0 ∪ F
1 ∪ {z} output 0 in E .
Similarly, due to the output of nodes in W ∪ F 2 in E3, the nodes in W1 ∪ F
2 output 1 in E . It
follows that in E2, nodes in W and F
2, as modeled by W1 and F
2 in E , output 1 while z outputs
0. Recall that, by construction, F 2 is non-empty. This violates agreement, a contradiction. 
Lemma A.2. If there exists a Byzantine consensus algorithm under the local broadcast model on
a graph G tolerating at most f Byzantine faulty nodes, then G is (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+ 1)-connected.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that G is not (
⌊
3f/2
⌋
+1)-connected and there exists
an algorithm A that solves Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast model on G. Then there
exists a vertex cut C of G of size at most
⌊
3f/2
⌋
with a partition (A,B,C) of V such that A and B
(both non-empty) are disconnected in G−C (so there is no edge between a node in A and a node
in B). Since |C| ≤
⌊
3f/2
⌋
, there exists a partition (C1, C2, C3) of C such that
∣∣C1∣∣ ,∣∣C2∣∣ ≤ ⌊f/2⌋
and
∣∣C3∣∣ ≤ ⌈f/2⌉. Recall that A outlines a procedure Au for each node u that describes u’s state
transitions in each round.
Similar to the proof of Lemma A.1, we first create a network G to model behavior of nodes in G
in three different executions E1, E2, and E3, which we will describe later. G consists of two copies
of each node in A and B, and a single copy of the remaining nodes. Figure 3 depicts G. The edges
in G can be deduced from Figure 3 along the lines of the proof of Lemma A.1. However, edges
within C are not shown in Figure 3. They are copied exactly from G. As in proof of Lemma A.1,
the structure of G ensures that, for each edge uv in the original graph G, each copy of u receives
messages from exactly one copy of v in G. This allows us to create an algorithm for G corresponding
to A as follows. For each node u ∈ G, if G has one copy of u then u runs Au. Otherwise there are
two copies u0 and u1 of u. Both u0 and u1 run Au.
Consider an execution E of the above algorithm on G as follows. Each node in A0, B0, and C
1
has input 0 and the remaining nodes have input 1. As in proof of Lemma A.1, we will show that
the algorithm does indeed terminate but nodes do not reach agreement in G, which will be useful
in deriving the desired contradiction. We use E to describe three executions E1, E2, and E3 of A
on the original graph G as follows.
E1: C
2∪C3 is the set of faulty nodes. In each round, a faulty node in C2∪C3 broadcasts the same
messages as the corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. All non-faulty
nodes have input 0. Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in A, B, and C1 is modelled
by the corresponding (copies of) nodes in A0, B0, and C
1, respectively, in E . Since A solves
Byzantine consensus on G, nodes in A, B, and C1 decide on output 0 (by validity) in finite
time.
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Figure 3: Network G to model executions E1, E2, and E3. Edges within the sets are not shown
while edges between sets/nodes are depicted as single edges. The crossed dotted lines emphasize
that there are no edges between the corresponding sets. The numbers adjacent to the sets/nodes
are the corresponding inputs in execution E . To reduce clutter, edges within C are not shown.
E2: C
1 ∪ C3 is the set of faulty nodes. In each round, a faulty node in C1 ∪ C3 broadcasts the
same messages as the corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. A has input
0 and all the remaining non-faulty nodes have input 1. Note that the behavior of non-faulty
nodes in A, B, and C2 is modelled by the corresponding (copies of) nodes in A0, B1, and C
2,
respectively, in E . The output of the non-faulty nodes will be described later.
E3: C
1∪C2 is the set of faulty nodes. In each round, a faulty node in C1∪C2 broadcasts the same
messages as the corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. All non-faulty
nodes have input 1. Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in A, B, and C3 is modelled
by the corresponding (copies of) nodes in A1, B1, and C
3, respectively, in E . Since A solves
Byzantine consensus on G, nodes in A, B, and C3 decide on output 1 (by validity) in finite
time.
Due to the output of nodes in A, B, and C1 in E1, the nodes in A0, B0, and C
1 output 0 in E .
Similarly, due to the output of nodes in A, B, and C3 in E3, the nodes in A1, B1, and C
3 output
1 in E . It follows that in E2, nodes in A, as modeled by A0 in E , output 0 while nodes in B, as
modeled by B1, output 1. Recall that, by construction, both A and B are non-empty. This violates
agreement, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Directly from Lemmas A.1 and A.2. 
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B Proofs of Section 5
In this section, we assume that the graph G satisfies the conditions in Theorem 5. The following
observation follows from the rules used for flooding.
Observation B.1. For any phase of Algorithm 1, in step (a) for any two nodes u, v ∈ V (possibly
faulty), if v receives value b along a fault-free uv-path then u broadcast the value b to its neighbors
during flooding.
Recall that, if a faulty node does not initiate flooding, then for the purpose of the above
observation, its behavior is equivalent to it flooding the value 1. We now give proofs of Lemmas
5.5, 5.2, and 5.3.
Proof of Lemma 5.5: Fix a phase of the algorithm and the corresponding set F . Consider
an arbitrary non-faulty node v such that v ∈ Bv in step (c). There are 4 cases to consider,
corresponding to the 4 cases in step (c).
Case 1: |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Nv| > f . Then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv. Therefore there exist
at least f + 1 nodes in Av . Node v selects f + 1 nodes A
′
v from Av by choosing all
nodes from Av ∩ F and the rest arbitrarily from Av − F . Define B
′
v := Bv ∩ (F − v).
Now,
∣∣B′v∣∣ ≤|Bv ∩ F | = |Zv ∩ F | ≤ ⌊f/2⌋ by assumption of case 1. Since G is (⌊3f/2⌋+1)-
connected, G−B′v is at least (f+1)-connected and there exist f+1 node-disjoint A
′
vv-paths
in G − B′v. Furthermore, since all the nodes in Av ∩ F are endpoints in these paths and
F = (Av ∩ F ) ∪ (Bv ∩ F ), we have that these paths exclude F
1.
Case 2: |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Nv| ≤ f . Then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv. Note that when f = 0, this
case is not possible since v ∈ Bv and so Bv = Nv must be non-empty. Since the degree of
v is at least 2f and there are at most f nodes in Bv (including v), we have that v has at
least f + 1 neighbors in Av. There are therefore f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths that have
no internal nodes and hence exclude F .
Case 3: |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Zv| > f . Then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv. We have that
|Nv ∩ F | = |F | −|Zv ∩ F |
≤ f −
⌊
f/2
⌋
− 1
≤
⌊
f/2
⌋
.
So this case is the same as Case 1 with the roles of Zv and Nv swapped.
Case 4: |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
f/2
⌋
and |Zv| ≤ f . Then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv. From the analysis in Case
3, we have that |Nv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
f/2
⌋
. So this case is the same as Case 2 with the roles of Zv
and Nv swapped.
In all four cases we have that there do exist f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths that exclude F . 
Proof of Lemma 5.2: Fix a phase of the algorithm and the corresponding set F . For any
node u, we denote the state at the beginning of the phase by γstartu and the state at the end of
the phase by γendu . Consider an arbitrary non-faulty node v and the sets Av and Bv in step (c).
If γstartv = γ
end
v , then the claim is trivially true. So suppose v ∈ Bv and v receives identical value
along f +1 node-disjoint Avv-paths that exclude F in step (a). Since the number of faulty nodes is
at most f , thus at least one of these paths is both fault-free and has a non-faulty endpoint (other
1Recall that a path that excludes X does not have nodes from X as internal nodes; however, nodes from X may
be the endpoints of the path.
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than v), say u. By Observation B.1, it follows that whatever value is received by v along this path
in step (a) is the value flooded by u. Therefore, γendv = γ
start
u , where u is a non-faulty node, as
required. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3: Fix a phase of the algorithm and the corresponding set F such that all
faulty nodes are contained in F . Let Z be the set of nodes that flooded 0 in step (a) of the phase
and let N be the set of nodes that flooded 1 in step (a). We first show that for any non-faulty node
v, Zv = Z and Nv = N . Consider an arbitrary node w ∈ Z (resp. w ∈ N) that flooded 0 (resp.
1) in step (a) of this phase. Observe that Pwv identified in step (b) of the phase excludes F and is
fault-free. Therefore, by Observation B.1, v receives 0 (resp. 1) along Pwv and correctly puts w in
the set Zv (resp. Nv), as required.
It follows that for any two non-faulty nodes u and v, we have that Zu = Zv = Z and Nu = Nv =
N . Thus Au = Av and Bu = Bv. Let A := Au and B := Bu. First note that A is always non-empty
as follows. If B is empty, then A = V is non-empty. If B is non-empty, then let w ∈ B be a node
in B. By Lemma 5.5, there exist f + 1 node-disjoint Aw-paths, which implies that |A| ≥ f + 1.
Now all nodes in A flooded identical value in step (a), say α. If u ∈ A, then u’s state is α at the
beginning of the phase and stays unchanged in step (c). Therefore, at the end of the phase γu = α.
If u ∈ B, then observe that the f + 1 node-disjoint Au-paths identified by u in step (c) are all
fault-free. By Observation B.1, it follows that u receives α identically along these f + 1 paths and
so, at the end of the phase, γu = α. Similarly for v, we have that γv = α, as required. 
C Efficient Algorithm for 2f-Connected Graphs
In this section we give an efficient algorithm when G is 2f -connected to prove Theorem 5.6. We
start by defining reliable message transmission.
Definition C.1. For two nodes u, v ∈ V , node v reliably receives a message flooded by node u if
1. u = v,
2. v is a neighbor of u, or
3. v receives the message identically on at least f + 1 node-disjoint uv-paths.
Observe that if a node u broadcasts a message M , then any node v cannot reliably receive a
message M ′ 6=M from u.
We will say that a non-faulty node is a type A node if it knows the identity of all f faulty nodes.
Any non-faulty node that is not type A node is said to be a type B node. Initially, all non-faulty
nodes are type B nodes. As the algorithm executes, some non-faulty nodes will discover the identity
of all the faulty nodes and become type A nodes.
The algorithm proceeds in three phases. In phase 1, each node v floods its input value. As
before, it requires v to first locally broadcast its input to its neighbors and then assist other nodes
to flood their values by forwarding received messages from its neighbors. Recall that flooding
completes in n synchronous rounds.
In phase 2, v floods all the messages it hears from its neighbors in phase 1. Recall that under
local broadcast model each node receives all the messages transmitted by its neighbors. After n
synchronous time steps, flooding in phase 2 will complete. These messages help identify faulty
nodes if they exhibit faulty behavior (i.e. tamper with messages). The details are in the proof of
Lemma C.2.
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In phase 3, type B nodes reach consensus and inform the type A nodes on the decision. As
discussed above, type A nodes can identify fault-free paths to each type B node. If no type B node
exists, then type A nodes decide by themselves.
The formal procedure is given in Algorithm 2 and a proof of correctness follows.
Algorithm 2: Proposed efficient algorithm for Byzantine consensus under the local broadcast
model when G is 2f -connected: Steps performed by node v are shown here.
Phase 1: Flood input value. (The steps taken to achieve flooding are described in the text
preceding Algorithm 1 pseudo-code.)
Phase 2: For each neighbor u of node v, v reports on the messages propagated by u in
phase 1. After the flooding of the reports is complete, node v attempts to discover
the faulty nodes as below.
For each node w in G such that v reliably received value b from w, do:
For each node u 6= w, identify 2f node-disjoint uw paths.
For each such path P and node z ∈ P , if v reliably receives that z forwarded
b¯ = 1− b as w’s value in phase 1, and z is the first such node in P , then v
sets z to be a faulty node.
Phase 3: After phase 2, v is either a type A node or a type B node. If v is a type B node,
then it decides from the input values it received reliably, by taking the majority
(in case of a tie, 0 is chosen as the majority value), and then floods the decision
value. Otherwise v is a type A node. Note that a type A node knows the identity
of all f faulty nodes and can thus identify fault-free paths from each node. So a
type A node can get the input value of a non-faulty node u by accepting the value
it receives on a fault-free uv-path. v waits for a decision value from a non-faulty
type B node. If a decision value is received along a fault-free path from a
non-faulty (type B) node,
then v decides on this value;
else v decides from the input values of all non-faulty nodes by taking the
majority.
The first lemma states that an adversary cannot hide a message broadcast by a faulty node.
Lemma C.2. A message sent by a faulty node is received reliably by every node.
Proof: Let u be an arbitrary faulty node and let v be an arbitrary node in G. If u = v or v
is a neighbor of u, then the claim is trivially true from Definition C.1. Otherwise, there exist 2f
node-disjoint paths from u to v as the graph is 2f -connected. Since u is faulty, only f − 1 of these
paths can have faulty nodes. Any message sent by u is received identically by all its neighbors, and
so v will receive it identically along the remaining f+1 node-disjoint paths that are fault-free. 
Next, we want to show that all type B nodes know the same set of input values. We need an
intermediate lemma to show that.
Lemma C.3. Let v and w be distinct nodes. In phase 1, if v reliably receives an input value of
some node u and w does not, then v knows the identity of f faulty nodes after phase 2.
Proof: Fix a node u with input b ∈ {0, 1} such that v reliably received b from u in phase 1 but
w did not. Observe that, by Lemma C.2, u is a non-faulty node since w did not reliably receive b
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from u in phase 1. Let P1, . . . , P2f be 2f node-disjoint uw-paths. Since w did not reliably receive
b from u in phase 1, therefore exactly f of these paths have faulty nodes. WLOG let these paths
be P1, . . . , Pf . By Lemma C.2, after phase 2, v reliably receives that some nodes on P1 . . . , Pf
forwarded b¯ = 1− b in phase 1. For each path, v sets the first such node to be faulty.
To see why this assignment of faulty nodes by v is correct, consider an arbitrary path in
P1, . . . , Pf . WLOG let this path be P1. Let z be the faulty node in P1 that tampers the message.
Observe that each of P1, . . . , Pf has exactly one faulty node that tampers the message. In phase 2,
by Lemma C.2, v reliably receives that z forwarded b¯ in phase 1. Moreover, let x be an arbitrary
node in P1 before z. Then x is non-faulty and forwarded b in phase 1. Therefore, in phase 2, v can
not reliably receive that x forwarded b¯ in phase 1. 
Lemma C.4. All type B nodes reliably receive the same set of input values in phase 1.
Proof: Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that two nodes v and w are type B nodes and
there exists a node u such that v reliably receives the input of u and w does not. Then, by Lemma
C.3, v knows the identity of f faulty nodes after phase 2. Therefore, v must be a type A node, a
contradiction. 
This next lemma shows that each node knows the input values of at least 2f other nodes.
Lemma C.5. Each node reliably receives input values of at least 2f other nodes in phase 1.
Proof: Since the graph is 2f connected, therefore each node has at least 2f neighbors. By
Definition C.1 each node reliably receives input from these 2f nodes in phase 1. 
We now have all the necessary lemmas to prove Theorem 5.6.
Proof of Theorem 5.6: Each phase of Algorithm 2 requires at most n synchronous rounds. Since
there are only 3 phases, so the algorithm terminates in O(n) synchronous rounds. For validity and
agreement, there are two cases to consider.
There is at least one type B node: For agreement, note that by Lemma C.4 all type B
nodes receive the same input values and therefore decide on the same value by taking the majority.
A type A node (if one exists) knows the identity of all f faulty nodes and so it can ignore messages
on paths with faulty nodes. So we only need one fault-free path between a type A node and any
type B node. Since there are at least f node-disjoint fault free-paths between any two nodes,
therefore in phase 3 each type A node correctly receives a message from a type B node about the
final decision and decides on the same value. For validity, note that by Lemma C.5 each type B
node has input values of at least 2f +1 nodes (including its own). So the decided value is an input
of at least f + 1 nodes. Since there are at most f faulty nodes, therefore the decided value is an
input of at least one non-faulty node, as required.
There are no type B nodes: Let u be an arbitrary non-faulty node. Since there are no type
B nodes, u is a type A node that does not receive any decision value from any type B node in phase
3. Since u knows the identity of f faulty nodes, u can identify fault-free paths to non-faulty nodes
and receive untampered messages from non-faulty nodes in phase 1 and ignore messages from any
path that contains a faulty node. Therefore, u knows the input values of all non-faulty nodes. For
agreement, observe that all non-faulty nodes are type A and each non-faulty node decides on the
same decision value by taking the majority of the input values of non-faulty nodes. For validity, all
non-faulty nodes consider the input values of non-faulty nodes. 
D Proofs of Section 6
This appendix pertains to the hybrid model.
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Figure 4: Network G to model executions E1, E2, and E3. To reduce clutter, the edges are shown
in three different figures. The left figure shows edges between S and the neighborhood of S. The
center figure shows edges within the neighborhood of S. The right figure shows edges between
W0 ∪W1 and the neighborhood of S. Edges within the sets are not shown while edges between
sets are depicted as single edges. The crossed dotted line between W0 and W1 (resp. T0 and T1)
emphasizes that there are no edges between W0 and W1 (resp. T0 and T1). The numbers adjacent
to the sets are the corresponding inputs in execution E .
D.1 Necessity of the conditions in Theorem 6.1
Lemma D.1. If there exists a Byzantine consensus algorithm under the hybrid model on a graph G
tolerating at most f Byzantine faulty nodes, of which at most t nodes, 0 < t ≤ f , are equivocating
faulty nodes, then every set of nodes S, such that 0 < |S| ≤ t, has at least 2f + 1 neighbors.
Proof: Consider t such that 0 < t ≤ f . Let ϕ = f − t. For the sake of contradiction, suppose
that there exists a non-empty set of nodes S in G of size at most t that has at most 2f neighbors
and there exists an algorithm A that solves Byzantine consensus under the hybrid model on G.
Recall that neighbors of S are nodes outside of S that have an edge to some node in S. It is easy
to show that when n > f ≥ t, each set of cardinality at most t must have at least one neighbor to
achieve consensus. So in the rest of the proof we assume that S has at least one neighbor. Let N
be the non-empty neighborhood of S. Then there exists a partition (F 1, F 2, R, T ) of N such that∣∣F 1∣∣ ,∣∣F 2∣∣ ≤ ϕ and |R| ,|T | ≤ t. Let W = V − (S ∪ N) be the set of remaining nodes. Note that
some of these sets (other than S) can be possibly empty. However, since n > t and N is non-empty,
we select these sets so that R is necessarily non-empty. Recall that A outlines a procedure Au for
each node u that describes u’s state transitions in each round.
Similar to the proof of Lemma A.1, we first create a network G to model behavior of nodes
in G in three different executions E1, E2, and E3, which we will describe later. G consists of two
copies of each node in W and T , and a single copy of the remaining nodes. Figure 4 depicts G.
The edges in G can be deduced from Figure 4 along the lines of the proof of Lemma A.1. As in
proof of Lemma A.1, the structure of G ensures that, for each edge uv in the original graph G, each
copy of u receives messages from exactly one copy of v in G. This allows us to create an algorithm
for G corresponding to A as follows. For each node u ∈ G, if G has one copy of u then u runs Au.
Otherwise there are two copies u0 and u1 of u. Both u0 and u1 run Au.
Consider an execution E of the above algorithm on G as follows. Each node in W0 ∪T0∪F
1 ∪S
has input 0 and the remaining nodes have input 1. As in proof of Lemma A.1, we will show that
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the algorithm does indeed terminate but nodes do not reach agreement in G, which will be useful
in deriving the desired contradiction. We use E to describe three executions E1, E2, and E3 of A
on the original graph G as follows.
E1: F
2 ∪ R is the set of faulty nodes and they are all non-equivocating faulty nodes. In each
round, a faulty node in F 2 ∪R broadcasts the same messages as the corresponding node in G
in execution E in the same round. All non-faulty nodes have input 0. Note that the behavior
of non-faulty nodes in S ∪ F 1, T , and W is modelled by the corresponding (copies of) nodes
in S ∪ F 1, T0, and W0, respectively, in E . Since A solves Byzantine consensus on G, nodes in
S ∪ F 1 ∪ T ∪W decide on output 0 (by validity) in finite time.
E2: F
1 is the set of non-equivocating faulty nodes and T is the set of equivocating faulty nodes.
In each round, a non-equivocating faulty node in F 1 broadcasts the same messages as the
corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. Recall that a equivocating faulty
node in T has the capability of point-to-point communication with its neighbors. The com-
munication by equivocating faulty nodes in T to its neighbors in S is the same as that by the
corresponding copy in T0 and to the remaining non-faulty neighbors is the same as that by the
corresponding copy in T1 in execution E . S has input 0 and all the remaining non-faulty nodes
have input 1. Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in S ∪ F 2, R and W is modelled by
the corresponding (copies of) nodes in S ∪ F 2, R, and W1, respectively, in E . The output of
the non-faulty nodes will be described later.
E3: F
1 ∪ S is the set of faulty nodes and they are all non-equivocating faulty nodes. In each
round, a faulty node in F 1 ∪ S broadcasts the same messages as the corresponding node in G
in execution E in the same round. All non-faulty nodes have input 1. Note that the behavior
of non-faulty nodes in R ∪ F 2, T , and W is modelled by the corresponding (copies of) nodes
in R ∪ F 2, T1, and W1, respectively, in E . Since A solves Byzantine consensus on G, nodes in
F 2 ∪R ∪ T ∪W decide on output 1 (by validity) in finite time.
Due to the output of nodes in S in E1, the nodes in S output 0 in E . Similarly, due to the
output of nodes in R in E3, the nodes in R output 1 in E . It follows that in E2, nodes in R as
modeled by R in E output 1 while S outputs 0. Recall that, by construction, both S and R are
non-empty. This violates agreement, a contradiction. 
Lemma D.2. If there exists a Byzantine consensus algorithm under the hybrid model on a graph
G tolerating at most f Byzantine faulty nodes, of which at most t are equivocating faulty nodes,
then G is (
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+ 2t+ 1)-connected.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that G is not (
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+2t+1)-connected and
there exists an algorithm A that solves Byzantine consensus under the hybrid model on G. Let
ϕ = f − t. Let C be a vertex cut of G of size at most
⌊
3ϕ/2
⌋
+ 2t with a partition (A,B,C) of
V such that A and B (both non-empty) are disconnected in G− C (so there is no edge between a
node in A and a node in B). Since |C| ≤
⌊
3ϕ/2
⌋
+ 2t, there exists a partition (C1, C2, C3, R, T ) of
C such that
∣∣C1∣∣ ,∣∣C2∣∣ ≤ ⌊ϕ/2⌋, ∣∣C3∣∣ ≤ ⌈ϕ/2⌉, and |R| ,|T | ≤ t. Recall that A outlines a procedure
Au for each node u that describes u’s state transitions in each round.
Similar to the proof of Lemma A.1, we first create a network G to model behavior of nodes in G
in three different executions E1, E2, and E3, which we will describe later. G consists of two copies
of each node in A, B, R, and T , and a single copy of the remaining nodes. Figure 5 depicts G. The
edges in G can be deduced from Figure 5 along the lines of the proof of Lemma A.1. As in proof of
Lemma A.1, the structure of G ensures that, for each edge uv in the original graph G, each copy
of u receives messages from exactly one copy of v in G. This allows us to create an algorithm for
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Figure 5: Network G to model executions E1, E2, and E3. To reduce clutter, the edges are shown in
three different figures. The left figure shows edges between the copies of nodes in A and the copies of
nodes in the cut C. The center figure shows edges among the copies of nodes in C. The right figure
shows edges between the copies of nodes in A and the copies of nodes in the cut C. Edges within
the sets are not shown while edges between sets are depicted as single edges. The crossed dotted
lines emphasize that there are no edges between the corresponding sets. The numbers adjacent to
the sets are the corresponding inputs in execution E .
G corresponding to A as follows. For each node u ∈ G, if G has one copy of u then u runs Au.
Otherwise there are two copies u0 and u1 of u. Both u0 and u1 run Au.
Consider an execution E of the above algorithm on G as follows. Each node in A0, B0, R0, T0,
and C1 has input 0 and the remaining nodes have input 1. As in proof of Lemma A.1, we will show
that the algorithm does indeed terminate but nodes do not reach agreement in G, which will be
useful in deriving the desired contradiction. We use E to describe three executions E1, E2, and E3
of A on the original graph G as follows.
E1: C
2∪C3 is the set of non-equivocating faulty nodes and T is the set of equivocating faulty nodes.
In each round, a non-equivocating faulty node in C2 ∪ C3 broadcasts the same messages as
the corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. Recall that a equivocating
faulty node in T has the capability of point-to-point communication with its neighbors. The
communication by equivocating faulty nodes in T to its neighbors in A is the same as that by
the corresponding copy in T1 and to the remaining non-faulty neighbors is the same as that
by the corresponding copy in T0 in execution E . All non-faulty nodes have input 0. Note that
the behavior of non-faulty nodes in A, B, R, and C1 is modelled by the corresponding (copies
of) nodes in A0, B0, R0, and C
1, respectively, in E . Since A solves Byzantine consensus on G,
nodes in A ∪B ∪R ∪C1 decide on output 0 (by validity) in finite time.
E2: C
1∪C3 is the set of non-equivocating faulty nodes and R is the set of equivocating faulty nodes.
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In each round, a non-equivocating faulty node in C1∪C3 broadcasts the same messages as the
corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. The communication by equivocating
faulty nodes in R to its neighbors in A is the same as that by the corresponding copy in R0
and to the remaining non-faulty neighbors is the same as that by the corresponding copy in
R1 in execution E . A has input 0 and all the remaining non-faulty nodes have input 1. Note
that the behavior of non-faulty nodes in A, B, T , and C2 is modelled by the corresponding
(copies of) nodes in A0, B1, T1, and C
2, respectively, in E . The output of the non-faulty nodes
will be described later.
E3: C
1∪C2 is the set of non-equivocating faulty nodes and T is the set of equivocating faulty nodes.
In each round, a non-equivocating faulty node in C1∪C2 broadcasts the same messages as the
corresponding node in G in execution E in the same round. The communication by equivocating
faulty nodes in T to its neighbors in B is the same as that by the corresponding copy in T1
and to the remaining non-faulty neighbors is the same as that by the corresponding copy in T0
in execution E . All non-faulty nodes have input 1. Note that the behavior of non-faulty nodes
in A, B, R, and C3 is modelled by the corresponding (copies of) nodes in A1, B1, R1, and C
3,
respectively, in E . Since A solves Byzantine consensus on G, nodes in A ∪B ∪R ∪ C3 decide
on output 1 (by validity) in finite time.
Due to the output of nodes in A in E1, the nodes in A0 output 0 in E . Similarly, due to the
output of nodes in B in E3, the nodes in B1 output 1 in E . It follows that in E2, nodes in A
as modeled by A0 in E output 0 while nodes in B as modeled by B1 output 1. Recall that, by
construction, both A and B are non-empty. This violates agreement, a contradiction. 
We now prove the necessity of the conditions in Theorem 6.1. The sufficiency is proved in the
next section.
Proof of necessity of the conditions in Theorem 6.1: Condition (i) follows from Lemma
D.2. For t = 0 condition (ii) follows from Lemma A.1 and for t > 0 condition (iii) follows from
Lemma D.1. 
D.2 Sufficiency of the conditions in Theorem 6.1
In this section, we assume that the graph G satisfies the conditions in Theorem 6.1. To prove
sufficiency of the conditions in Theorem 6.1, we modify Algorithm 1 for the hybrid setting. The
formal procedure is given in Algorithm 3.
For correctness, we follow the same ideas as the proof of Theorem 5.1. We assume that t > 0 in
the proof since Algorithm 3 is the same as Algorithm 1 when t = 0. We follow the same strategy
as in Section 5.2. Let T ∗ be the actual equivocating faulty set of size at most t and F ∗ the actual
non-equivocating faulty set of size at most f −|T ∗|.
Similar to Observation B.1, the following follows from the rules used for flooding.
Observation D.3. For any phase of Algorithm 3, in step (a) for any two nodes u, v ∈ V − T ∗
(possibly non-equivocating faulty), if v receives value b along a fault-free uv-path then u broadcast
the value b to its neighbors during flooding.
The next two lemmas state that the paths identified in steps (b) and (c), respectively, do indeed
exist.
Lemma D.4. For any choice of sets F and T in Algorithm 3, and any two nodes u, v, there exists
a uv-path that excludes F ∪ T .
Proof: Recall that a path is said to exclude F ∪ T if none of the internal nodes in the path
belong to F ∪ T . Since G is (
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+ 2t+ 1)-connected, by Menger’s Theorem, there are at
25
Algorithm 3: Proposed algorithm for Byzantine consensus under the hybrid model: Steps
performed by node v are shown here.
Each node v has a binary input value in {0, 1}, and maintains a binary state γv ∈ {0, 1}.
Initialization: γv := input value of node v
For each pair of sets F, T ⊆ V such that F ⊆ V − T , |T | ≤ t, and |F | ≤ f −|T | do
Step (a): Flood value γv. (The steps taken to achieve flooding are described in the text
preceding Algorithm 1 pseudo-code.)
Step (b): For each node u ∈ V − T , identify a single uv-path Puv that excludes F ∪ T . Let,
Zv :=
{
u ∈ V − T | v received value 0 from u along Puv in step (a)
}
,
Nv := V − T − Zv.
Step (c): Let,
ϕ = f −|T | .
Define sets Av and Bv as follows.
Case 1: If |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Nv| > f , then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv.
Case 2: If |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Nv| ≤ f , then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv.
Case 3: If |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Zv| > f , then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv.
Case 4: If |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Zv| ≤ f , then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv.
If v ∈ Bv and v receives value δ ∈ {0, 1} along any f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths
that exclude F ∪ T in step (a), then γv := δ.
end
Output γv.
least (
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+2t+1) node-disjoint paths between any two nodes u, v. For any f, t such that
0 ≤ t ≤ f , we have that
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+ 2t + 1 ≥ (f − t) + t + 1 = f + 1. Thus, there are at least
f + 1 node-disjoint uv-paths, of which at least one path must exclude F ∪ T , since |F ∪ T | ≤ f .

Lemma D.5. For any non-faulty node v and any given phase of Algorithm 3 with the corresponding
sets F and T , in step (c), if v ∈ Bv, then there exist f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths that exclude
F ∪ T .
Proof: Fix a phase in the algorithm and the corresponding sets F and T . Let ϕ = f −|T | as in
the algorithm. Consider an arbitrary non-faulty node v such that v ∈ Bv in step (c). There are 4
cases to consider, corresponding to the 4 cases in step (c). Note that neither Av nor Bv contain
any node from T .
Case 1: |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Nv| > f . Then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv. Therefore there exist at
least f + 1 nodes in Av. Node v selects f + 1 nodes A
′
v from Av by choosing all nodes
from Av ∩F and the rest arbitrarily from Av −F . Define B
′
v = Bv ∩ (F − v). Now,
∣∣B′v∣∣ ≤
|Bv ∩ F | = |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
by assumption of case 1. Since G is (
⌊
3(f − t)/2
⌋
+ 2t + 1)-
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connected, the vertex connectivity of G− T −B′v is at least⌊
3(f − t)
2
⌋
+ 2t+ 1−|T | −
⌊
ϕ
2
⌋
= f − t+
⌊
f − t
2
⌋
+ 2t+ 1−|T | −
⌊
f −|T |
2
⌋
= 1 + t+
⌊
f − t
2
⌋
+ f −|T | −
⌊
f −|T |
2
⌋
= 1 + t+
⌊
f − t
2
⌋
+
⌈
f −|T |
2
⌉
≥ 1 + t+
⌊
f − t
2
⌋
+
⌈
f − t
2
⌉
= f − t+ t+ 1
= f + 1.
So there exist f + 1 node-disjoint A′vv-paths in G − T − B
′
v. Furthermore, since all the
nodes in Av ∩ F are endpoints in these paths and F = (Av ∩ F ) ∪ (Bv ∩ F ), we have that
these paths exclude2 F ∪ T .
Case 2: |Zv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Nv| ≤ f . Then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv. Recall that 0 < t ≤ f and
|F | ≤ ϕ. Let F ′ be a maximal set such that
(i) F ′ ⊆ Bv − v,
(ii) F ′ ⊇ (F ∩Bv)− v, and
(iii)
∣∣F ′∣∣ ≤ ϕ,
i.e., there is no set F ′′ ⊇ F ′ such that
(i) F ′′ ⊆ Bv − v,
(ii) F ′′ ⊇ (F ∩Bv)− v, and
(iii)
∣∣F ′′∣∣ ≤ ϕ.
Note that F ′ exists because |F | ≤ ϕ. Let B′v = Bv − F
′. We first show that
∣∣B′v∣∣ ≤ t.
There are two cases to consider. In the first case,
∣∣F ′∣∣ < ϕ. Then v is the only node
in B′v = Bv − F
′ as follows. Suppose there is another node u ∈ B′v = Bv − F
′. Then
F ′ ∪{u} ⊆ Bv − v and F
′ ∪ {u} ⊇ F ′ ⊇ (F ∩Bv)− v. Moreover,
∣∣F ′ ∪ {u}∣∣ = ∣∣F ′∣∣+1 ≤ ϕ,
a contradiction since F ′ is maximal. So we have that
∣∣B′v∣∣ = 1 ≤ t. In the second case,∣∣F ′∣∣ = ϕ, and we have that ∣∣B′v∣∣ = |Bv| − ϕ = |Nv| − ϕ ≤ f − ϕ = |T | ≤ t.
We construct a graph H from G− T −F ′ as follows. Remove all edges uw such that both
u,w ∈ Av. Add a node r with edges to all nodes in Av . We first show that H has f + 1
node-disjoint rv-paths. So suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that H does not have
f + 1 node-disjoint rv-paths. Then by Menger’s Theorem, there exists an rv-cut C of size
at most f . This partitions H − C into (R,S) such that R and S are both non-empty and
disconnected with r ∈ R and v ∈ S. Since r has an edge to each node in Av, we have that
S ⊆ B′v and so |S| ≤ t. All the neighbors of S in H are contained entirely in C
3. Since
no edge incident to any node in B′v in G was removed when constructing graph H, so all
the neighbors of S in G are contained entirely in C ∪ T ∪F ′. It follows that S has at most
f +|T |+ϕ = f +|T |+ f −|T | = 2f neighbors in G, a contradiction with the condition (iii)
in Theorem 6.1.
2Recall that a path is said to exclude X if none of the internal nodes in the path belong to X.
3Recall that neighbors of S are nodes outside of S that have an edge to some node in S.
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We now show that f+1 node-disjoint rv-paths inH imply that there are f+1 node-disjoint
Avv-paths in G that exclude F ∪ T . Observe that an rv-path P in H can have more than
one node from Av. However, since r has an edge to each node in Av , a shorter sub-path
P ′ exists that contains only the last node from Av in P . Furthermore, if a path Q and P
are node-disjoint, then so are Q and P ′. So there exist f + 1 node-disjoint rv-paths that
each contain exactly one node from Av. By removing the endpoint r from each of these
paths, we get f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths. Since each of these paths have exactly one
node from Av, this must necessarily be an endpoint. So each of these paths exclude Av.
By construction of H, these paths exist in G− T − F ′ and so exclude F ′ and T as well.
Now, Av ⊇ Av ∩F and F = (Av ∩F )∪ (Bv ∩F ). Recall that F
′ ⊇ (Bv ∩F )− v. It follows
that the f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths above exclude Av ∪ F
′ ∪ T ⊇ (F − v) ∪ T . Since v
can only be an endpoint in these paths, we have that these f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths
exclude F ∪ T , as required.
Case 3: |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Zv| > f . Then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv. We have that
|Nv ∩ F | = |F | −|Zv ∩ F |
≤ ϕ−
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
− 1
≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
.
So this case is the same as Case 1 with the roles of Zv and Nv swapped.
Case 4: |Zv ∩ F | >
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
and |Zv| ≤ f . Then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv. From the analysis in Case
3, we have that |Nv ∩ F | ≤
⌊
ϕ/2
⌋
. So this case is the same as Case 2 with the roles of Zv
and Nv swapped.
So we have that there do exist f + 1 node-disjoint Avv-paths that exclude F ∪ T . 
The next lemma states that in any phase, the state of a non-faulty node at the end of the phase
equals the state of some non-faulty node at the beginning of the phase.
Lemma D.6. For any non-faulty node v, its state γv at the end of any given phase equals the state
of some non-faulty node at the start of that phase.
Proof: Fix a phase in the algorithm and the corresponding sets F and T . For any node u, we
denote the state at the beginning of the phase by γstartu and the state at the end of the phase by
γendu . Consider an arbitrary non-faulty node v and the sets Av and Bv in step (c). If γ
start
v = γ
end
v ,
then the claim is trivially true. So suppose v ∈ Bv and v receives identical value along f + 1
node-disjoint Avv-paths in step (a). Since the number of faulty nodes is at most f , at least one of
these paths is both fault-free and has a non-faulty endpoint (other than v), say u. By Observation
D.3, it follows that whatever value is received by v along this path in step (a) is the value flooded
by u. Therefore, γendv = γ
start
u , where u is a non-faulty node, as required. 
Next, we show that when the sets F and T are properly selected, all non-faulty nodes reach
agreement in that phase.
Lemma D.7. Consider the unique phase of the Algorithm 3 where F = F ∗ and T = T ∗. At the
end of this phase, every pair of non-faulty nodes u, v ∈ V have identical state, i.e., γu = γv.
Proof: Consider the unique phase of the algorithm where F = F ∗ and T = T ∗. By choice of
T , all equivocating faulty nodes are in T so each node in V − T floods one value, and one value
only, in step (a) of the phase. Let Z ⊆ V − T be the set of nodes that flooded 0 in step (a) and let
N ⊆ V − T be the set of nodes that flooded 1 in step (a). We first show that for any non-faulty
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node v, Zv = Z and Nv = N . Consider an arbitrary node w ∈ V − T that flooded 0 (resp. 1) in
step (a) of this phase. Note that w ∈ Z (resp. w ∈ N). Observe that Pwv identified in step (b) of
the phase excludes T ∪ F and is fault-free. Therefore, by Observation D.3, v receives 0 (resp. 1)
along Pwv and correctly puts w in the set Zv (resp. Nv), as required.
It follows that for any two non-faulty nodes u and v, we have that Zu = Zv = Z and Nu =
Nv = N . Thus Au = Av and Bu = Bv. Let A := Au and B := Bu. Since T = T
∗ has no non-faulty
node, a non-faulty node is either in A or in B. First note that A is always non-empty as follows. If
B is empty, then A = V −T is non-empty since n > f . If B is non-empty, then let w ∈ B be a node
in B. By Lemma D.5, there exist f + 1 node-disjoint Aw-paths, which implies that |A| ≥ f + 1.
Now all nodes in A flooded identical value in step (a), say α. If u ∈ A, then u’s state is α at the
beginning of the phase and stays unchanged in step (c). Therefore, at the end of the phase γu = α.
If u ∈ B, then observe that the f + 1 node-disjoint Au-paths identified by u in step (c) are all
fault-free. By Observation D.3, it follows that u receives α identically along these f + 1 paths and
so, at the end of the phase, γu = α. Similarly for v, we have that γv = α, as required. 
We now have all the necessary ingredients to prove the sufficiency portion of Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: The necessity of the conditions in Theorem 6.1 were proven in Appendix
D.1. For sufficiency, we prove the correctness of Algorithm 3.
The algorithm terminates in finite time because the number of phases is finite and flooding in
each phase completes in finite time. Thus, the algorithm satisfies the termination condition.
Since there are at most f faulty nodes with at most t equivocating faulty nodes in any given
execution, there exists at least one phase in which sets F = F ∗ and T = T ∗. Then, from Lemma
D.7, we have that all non-faulty nodes have the same state at the end of this phase. Lemma D.6
implies that the state of the non-faulty nodes will remain unchanged after any subsequent phases.
Therefore, all non-faulty nodes will have the same state at the end of the algorithm, and their
output will be identical. This proves that the algorithm satisfies the agreement condition.
At the start of phase 1, the state of each non-faulty node equals its own input. Now, applying
Lemma D.6 inductively implies that the state of a non-faulty node always equals the input of some
non-faulty node. This, in turn, implies that the algorithm satisfies the validity condition. Thus, we
have proved correctness of Algorithm 3 under the conditions stated in Theorem 6.1. 
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